[mirror-admin] excessive churn on linux/development/

[Axel Thimm]

On Fri, Sep 19, 2008 at 09:27:36AM -0700, Jesse Keating wrote:
> (we recently started using multiple keys, one for each release)
> [...]

A bit off-topic, but how is this going to play out when updating from
F<N> to F<N+1> or later? The new key will have to be accepted by the
user each time?

Wouldn't that open the possibility of spoofed updates? If the users
get accustomed to always acking a new key on release updates will they
really check whether any fingerprints of new keys match those from the
Fedora Project, or will they happily accept keys and packages from a
compromised mirror on F9->F10 updates (or F9->F11, F10->F11 etc.)?

Ideally there is some trust transitivity mechanism in place like a
master key signing those keys or similar.

Just playing the devil's advocate.
-- 
Axel.Thimm at ATrpms.net
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