[ale] Fwd: Voting machines

[Phil Turmel]

As long as the key continues to exist, additional/replacement ballots 
could be generated, with any desired fake timestamp.

On 12/8/20 9:22 PM, Bruno Bronosky wrote:
> You wouldn't have to destroy the key. The hash would include the time of 
> creation. I'm thinking of it like a git commit.
> 
> On Tue, Dec 8, 2020 at 3:40 PM Phil Turmel via Ale <ale at ale.org 
> <mailto:ale at ale.org>> wrote:
> 
>     I like your hash idea, with one tweak:  the hashing is done with a
>     digital key that is *destroyed* after sufficient ballots are printed
>     (registered voters plus some extra--extras destroyed on close of polls).
> 
>     On 12/8/20 2:57 PM, Bruno Bronosky via Ale wrote:
>      > The paper ballot "fill in the bubble system" works fine as long
>     as every
>      > piece of paper has a signed hash and the voter walks away with that
>      > hash. Using a touch screen machine for people who want/need it works
>      > fine, as long as it prints a paper ballot that the user turns in.
>     There
>      > should be a very simple (online?) way for anyone with a serial
>     number to
>      > verify that their ballot was **counted**. If you want to "audit"
>     your
>      > ballot at any time, that state ought to be able to produce a
>     container
>      > that your ballot is known to be in and the totals for that
>     container. It
>      > would be possible for any GA high school graduate to walk away
>     confident
>      > that at least the container that holds their ballot contains exactly
>      > what the label claims. The totals and a list of contained hashes
>     would
>      > be available to anyone who wants them. There would also be a list
>     of who
>      > has audited each container.
>      >
>      > This solves:
>      > - Voters must not be able to be compelled to vote any specific way
>      > (ballots are anonymous)
>      > - Ballots that go missing can be identified
>      > - Ballots that do not originate from the Authority can be identified
>      > - Ballots that are duplicated can be identified
>      > - Vote totals can be verified
>      >
>      > All ballot hashes are produced from a digital key that only the
>      > Authority (a single human) has access to. Ballots are only
>     printed as
>      > needed. The accountability falls on the Authority to ensure the
>     security
>      > of the ballots. That individual or someone in the chain of
>     command will
>      > face legal consequences for impropriety.
>      >
>      > What am I missing?
>      >
>      >
>      > .!# BrunoBronosky #!.