[ale] Voting machines

H P Ladds householdwords at gmail.com
Tue Dec 8 13:06:57 EST 2020


What is the debate at hand, that we should advocate for OS code running
voting machines?

Count me as a "meh." Sure, I'm all for having the code open for inspection.
But, is the security of an election truly related to the transparency or
security of voting machines' software?

Isn't any malfeasance in the software incredibly easy to detect? Run 5,000
known ballots through a vote counting machine. If it counts them correctly,
what is the issue? In this test, the machine's hardware, not its software,
would deservedly get the credit for the accuracy of the count.

It would be difficult to execute a Chyster/Fiat emissions testing type
fraud, given the ease with which it can be detected/prevented. The evidence
doesn't disappear into the atmosphere; there is a paper trail. (Please, Mr.
Secretary, tell me that the machines are tested for accuracy before, during
and after the counts! And that the machines don't go into a special
"testing mode.")

A vote casting machine that maliciously changes votes and literally prints
out proof of the change is destined to meet with considerable disapproval.
If the machine prints out correctly marked ballots, no one is particularly
impressed by the software or reassured that they could review the code.

On Mon, Dec 7, 2020 at 11:16 PM Bruno Bronosky via Ale <ale at ale.org> wrote:

> I know this used to be a big issue with this group. I'm surprised there's
> no talk of it now.
> --
> .!# BrunoBronosky #!.
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