[ale] Its over. Maybe

[Jeff Hubbs]

Geoffrey -

Even that level of oversight is futile, as you'd have no assurance
whatsoever that the code that was reviewed was actually running on the
machines during an election.  There's so much opportunity for that and
other sleight of hand.  You'd have to have such a system of forensics
and field checks built up around the machines to establish confidence in
the process that I just don't see the point of the machines.  Except
possibly, of course, to make our elections a sham.



On Wed, 2004-11-03 at 20:14, Geoffrey wrote:
> Jim Popovitch wrote:
> > On Wed, 2004-11-03 at 19:39 -0500, Geoffrey wrote:
> > 
> > 
> >> I'd still like to be able to verify that my vote was counted
> >> properly. You can not do this without a paper trail and review of
> >> the source code by an external non-partisan entity.  So closed
> >> source isn't that bad, as long as there's more than one entity who
> >> knows how it works.
> >> 
> > 
> > 
> > Many people (entities too) have looked at Diebold.  I think what you
> > are really saying is that you won't believe your vote counted until
> > YOU see the source.  I'm happy trusting others, esp in this case
> > where there has been so much recent focus, and esp others more
> > qualified.
> 
> No, I'm not saying that I want to see the source.  I meant what I 
> posted, 'review of the source code by an external non-partisan entity.'
> 
> Who, exactly has reviewed the Diebold systems, that is, besides Diebold?
> Oh, and Cathy Cox?