<p>I like recycling the existing machines to paper print a ballot that is office = name legible and a machine name and timestamp stub for the voter to take home and display proudly. <br>
We know enough tech to be able to optically scan those ballots and can hand count them for verification.<br>
I can't begin to express the horror I feel at online voting proposals. </p>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Sep 28, 2011 9:42 PM, "planas" <<a href="mailto:jslozier@gmail.com">jslozier@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br type="attribution">> Hi<br>> <br>> <br>> On Wed, 2011-09-28 at 21:00 -0400, Drifter wrote: <br>
> <br>>> Some random thoughts on voter fraud with paper ballots:<br>>> <br>>> I actually spend nearly 30 years living in rural communities in Virginia <br>>> and voting on paper ballots was the only option.<br>
>> <br>>> The primary difference between fraud with paper ballots and fraud with any <br>>> sort of machine, whether mechanical or electronic, is the difference <br>>> between retail and wholesale. With paper ballots the effective maximum <br>
>> size of a precinct is 500 actual voters -- so maybe 600 or so on the <br>>> rolls. Why? Because counting paper ballots is extremely time consuming. <br>>> At the end of the count if the tally sheets do not agree, then the judges <br>
>> have to count the ballots all over again. Ouch!<br>>> If one or more of the election judges is able to tamper with the tally, <br>>> then the best they can do is compromise the voting of that one precinct. <br>
>> And the only way to tamper with the tally is to tamper with the individual <br>>> ballots, which also takes time. (That's why I always marked my ballot with <br>>> a pen and not the provided pencil.)<br>
>> <br>>> Once voting machines are in use the fraud game changes radically. The <br>>> precincts are larger -- much larger: 3,000 on the rolls is common. The <br>>> much larger population of voters makes the fraud much harder to detect:<br>
>> Election judges no longer know every one by sight;<br>>> which means it is easier to vote the graveyard, and for those so<br>>> inclined to vote several times.<br>> <br>> When one registers to vote you must provide ID, which can forged. The<br>
> problem is that very rarely does the deputy registrar personally know<br>> the person in any suburban or urban area. With the appropriate IDs and<br>> little time, one could be registered in multiple precincts. Stuffing the<br>
> ballot box by this method has been done but requires many people to be<br>> in on the fraud and only takes one to sing. Manipulating an electronic<br>> file requires far few people maybe as few as 2 or 3. This would make the<br>
> fraud much harder to detect. <br>> <br>>> The shifting ratio of election judges to voters makes it easier to hide<br>>> the fraud;<br>>> The vote totals are larger making the fraud more likely to affect the<br>
>> election.<br>>> Tampering with a few machines takes far less time than tampering with<br>>> hundreds of paper ballots.<br>>> <br>>> So, yes; returning to paper ballots would significantly reduce the chance <br>
>> of an election being stolen through fraud. Are paper ballots going to <br>>> reappear in urban areas? Nope.<br>>> <br>>> Electronic voting frightens me because for the first time voter fraud can <br>
>> now change the tally for an entire county or city. And the knowledge and <br>>> skills of Michael Warfield or Bob Toxen are not needed. Any reasonably <br>>> intelligent staffer in the Registrar's Office can be taught how to do it. <br>
>> Five minutes alone at the right terminal should be more than enough time.<br>>> The only way to prevent this kind of fraud is, as Michael suggests, to <br>>> require end-to-end verification and auditing confirmation.<br>
>> <br>>> Sean<br>>> <br>>> -------------------------------------------------------<br>>> <br>>> <br>>> On Wednesday, September 28, 2011 04:59:51 pm Michael H. Warfield wrote:<br>
>> > On Wed, 2011-09-28 at 15:38 -0400, Cameron Kilgore wrote:<br>>> > > I still wonder the need to complicate and put at risk the reliability<br>>> > > of our one measure of democracy. Paper ballots seem more reliable<br>
>> > > and less prone to a politician's whim.<br>>> > <br>>> > On that, we may have to agree to disagree.<br>>> > <br>>> > On one hand, there have certainly been sufficient examples of "hanging<br>
>> > chads" and misplaced bags of ballots and ballot count mismatches to<br>>> > argue that paper ballots are neither reliable nor less prone to a<br>>> > politician's will.<br>>> > <br>
>> > OTOH, there have been proposals for voting protocols down through the<br>>> > years which can insure authenticity and authorization while preserving<br>>> > anonymity while still providing end to end verification and auditing<br>
>> > confirmation. I've seen some such proposed at security conferences<br>>> > such as NDSS, Usenix Security Symposium, and RSA over the last decade<br>>> > or so. We know how to do it right.<br>
>> > <br>>> > The problem is that these protocols are "open" and, as such, can not be<br>>> > held for ransom by companies wanting to leverage the maximum number of<br>>> > tax dollars out of pockets for their proprietary solutions and they are<br>
>> > too good for those people who don't want something that good...<br>>> > <br>>> > We can agree that the current field of voting machines are an abysmal<br>>> > and embarrassing lot of junk that should have been rejected out of hand<br>
>> > by anyone with any respect for the institution. Trouble is, that's not<br>>> > those with the vested interests.<br>>> > <br>>> > Regards,<br>>> > Mike<br>>> > <br>
>> > > --Cameron <<a href="http://ghostfreeman.net">http://ghostfreeman.net</a>><br>>> > > <br>>> > > <br>>> > > On Wed, Sep 28, 2011 at 3:34 PM, Geoffrey Myers<br>>> > > <<a href="mailto:lists@serioustechnology.com">lists@serioustechnology.com</a><br>
>> > > <br>>> > > > wrote:<br>>> > > > <br>>> > > > Anyone else catch this?<br>>> > > > <br>>> > > > <br>>> > > > <a href="http://hardware.slashdot.org/story/11/09/28/0241201/man-in-the-midd">http://hardware.slashdot.org/story/11/09/28/0241201/man-in-the-midd</a><br>
>> > > > le-remote-attack-on-diebold-voting-machines<br>>> > > > <br>>> > > > --<br>>> > > > Later, Geoffrey<br>>> > > > Sent from my iPhone<br>>> > > > _______________________________________________<br>
>> > > > Ale mailing list<br>>> > > > <a href="mailto:Ale@ale.org">Ale@ale.org</a><br>>> > > > <a href="http://mail.ale.org/mailman/listinfo/ale">http://mail.ale.org/mailman/listinfo/ale</a><br>
>> > > > See JOBS, ANNOUNCE and SCHOOLS lists at<br>>> > > > <a href="http://mail.ale.org/mailman/listinfo">http://mail.ale.org/mailman/listinfo</a><br>>> > > <br>>> > > _______________________________________________<br>
>> > > Ale mailing list<br>>> > > <a href="mailto:Ale@ale.org">Ale@ale.org</a><br>>> > > <a href="http://mail.ale.org/mailman/listinfo/ale">http://mail.ale.org/mailman/listinfo/ale</a><br>
>> > > See JOBS, ANNOUNCE and SCHOOLS lists at<br>>> > > <a href="http://mail.ale.org/mailman/listinfo">http://mail.ale.org/mailman/listinfo</a><br>>> _______________________________________________<br>
>> Ale mailing list<br>>> <a href="mailto:Ale@ale.org">Ale@ale.org</a><br>>> <a href="http://mail.ale.org/mailman/listinfo/ale">http://mail.ale.org/mailman/listinfo/ale</a><br>>> See JOBS, ANNOUNCE and SCHOOLS lists at<br>
>> <a href="http://mail.ale.org/mailman/listinfo">http://mail.ale.org/mailman/listinfo</a><br>> <br>> <br>> <br>> -- <br>> Jay Lozier<br>> <a href="mailto:jslozier@gmail.com">jslozier@gmail.com</a><br>
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